This is a conversation with Rim-Sarah Alouane. She’s a French legal academic, commentator, and PhD candidate in law researching religious freedom, human rights, and civil liberties in France, Europe & North America.

We spoke about a recent piece she wrote entitled ‘A Spectre in France’s Public Debate: Islamo-Leftism‘ for Reset Dialogues.

Topics Discussed

• What the fuck is ‘Islamo-leftism’
• How fringe conspiracy theories are being mainstreamed in France
• The role of anti-American sentiments in propagating these phenomena
• Understanding the specificity of French laicité/secularism
• The youth being more comfortable with multi-culturalism, which is provoking a conservative backlash
• The slippery slope of what’s being normalized (including security laws)
• The links between antisemitism and islamophobia, in terms of political rhetoric especially
• The legacy of colonial thinking
• The personal cost of rising authoritarianism in France

Recommended Books

• Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies by Nader Hashemi
• Illégitimes by Nesrine Slaoui
• Les Incasables by Rachid Zerrouki

If you like what I do, please consider supporting this project with only 1$ a month on Patreon or on BuyMeACoffee.com. You can also do so directly on PayPal if you prefer.

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Music by Tarabeat.

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Transcript via Antidote Zine:

That’s how the vilification process works: you target someone, you make things up—or if it’s a marginal phenomenon you make it bigger than it is—and instead of opening a debate, you vilify people. The more it’s normalized, the more it’s mainstreamed, the more some media condone it without giving voice to the people affected, the more we are at risk to see our democracy and its foundations falling apart.

Rim-Sarah Alouane: My name is Rim-Sarah Alouane; I am a French legal academic and a PhD candidate at the Université Toulouse Capitole. My research mainly focuses on constitutional law, comparative law especially, and civil liberties, religious freedom, and human rights.

Elia J. Ayoub: The title of your piece, the one we’ll be focusing on, is “A Spectre in France’s Public Debate: Islamo-Leftism.” Just for some background, can you tell us a bit about the piece? Why was it important to write? And for anyone who’s not in France, what the hell is “Islamo-leftism” in the first place?

RA: We are in the middle of a pandemic—the situation in France is quite disturbing and worrying. The only thing that our minister of higher education and innovation, Frédérique Vidal, found to say in an interview was that she is going to ask for an inquiry on Islamo-leftism at universities.

Honestly, at first I thought it was a joke. I thought it literally was Le Gorafi, which is the French equivalent of The Onion. Then I realized it was not a joke! Was I surprised? No, because it’s not something new. But why did I write that piece? Because I am a young scholar; I am doing my PhD on a topic that is very touchy, very tough, very complicated, very heavy in law—and I couldn’t stay silent, because those kinds of baseless accusations, conspiracy theories really, reminded me of a very dark time in our history, especially the thirties.

For those who know a bit of the history of Europe, I think you know what I’m talking about. The accusation at that time was of the so-called “Judeo-Masonic lobby,” and the attacks eventually ended up with the cleansing of universities and academics under the Vichy regime in the forties. It’s not good news, and I felt that I needed to tell people what’s going on and how dangerous this kind of narrative is, and how it is the continuity of an ongoing practice from the authorities to target and attempt to limit civil liberties.

EA: The idea of Islamo-leftism should have rung some bells; the Judeo-Masonic thing we know, but Judeo-Bolshevism was also spread in the thirties. Parallel to what we saw under Trump as well, with a normalization of this kind of antisemitic rhetoric in the US, it started off as fringe ideas, fringe conspiracy theories, and these things—through the internet, and various machineries that people are familiar with—were no longer fringe anymore.

In France, we’re also no longer talking about “fringe” anymore, are we?

RA: Unfortunately, these are fringe ideas that are being mainstreamed. All of these conspiracy theories, that literally nobody knew about, are now becoming the new normal because we have certain types of media that are spreading them. France has an equivalent of Fox News, called CNews. 

You asked me what the hell Islamo-leftism is, and I want to respond: I don’t even want to call it a concept, because it’s not a concept. It is a weird ideology, and the idea was first coined by the French philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff (I don’t want to give him too much airtime) to “call out” the “alliances” between the far left (especially Marxists) and Islamists in the UK and France.

“Islamo-leftism” was used by neocons in France to target and go after progressive movements, and to try to discredit activists who are working on issues related to discrimination, race, intersectionality, gender, women’s rights, and so on. Basically the idea is the more you are working on this issue, the more likely you are to be accused of siding with terrorists—and especially, at the moment, Islamists and Islamist terrorists.

These attacks on French academia and French universities are also driven by a very strong anti-Muslim hatred. It’s a combo of both—and I’ll add that since those accusations, the minister of national education Jean-Michel Blanquer declared that it comes from American campuses. It comes from a strong anti-US sentiment added on top, implying that anything that comes from America (a multicultural country) is a threat to France.

Again, it’s all conspiracy theory. It’s all divide-and-conquer. Unfortunately, again, it’s not a new phenomenon. It didn’t start with Frédérique Vidal or Jean-Michel Blanquer’s accusations. After the first wave of terrorist attacks, in the aftermath of Charlie Hebdo especially, Manuel Valls, our former prime minister (who is a socialist!) basically accused sociologists who tried to understand radicalization (because you need to understand the phenomenon to be able to counter it, to find solutions) of trying to “excuse” it—which is very harsh. 

It kept going: every time an antiracism group or even academics working on this issue raised those issues, they are accused of siding with terrorism, and their names are trashed. Finally, add on top of that: within academia, there is a fringe of academics who are fighting these kinds of movements. The idea is that all these groups of people want to erase huge areas of research that are related to humanities and social sciences. 

EA: Thanks for that. The French minister of education’s tweet you posted specifically cited “intersectionality” as responsible for the rise of Islamism and the fragmentation of French society—which is extraordinary to me.

Let’s provide some historical background to the specific French context of laïcité, which is different from secularism. As someone who went to a laic school in Lebanon, I know this very well. I’ll quote a section from your essay:

“France’s constitution is grounded on republican theories which emerged during the century of Enlightenment and crystallized during the French revolution of 1789. Republicanism stresses a universalist French identity that supercedes individual, cultural, social, or religious belonging, as opposed to an American-style multiculturalism that seeks public respect of cultural diversity. It is the growing popularity of the latter among French citizens that has brought this issue to a head.”

There are two things in this paragraph; one is the specific form of republicanism which is different from American republicanism and Irish republicanism—we can just say “laïcité” to distinguish. The second is the growing popularity of multiculturalism in France, especially among the younger generation—why is that specific phenomenon such a threat to the people who oppose it? 

RA: There is a lot to say, but I need to give you some historical background and context. 

France is a constitutional republic, currently governed by the constitution of 1958—we are in the fifth republic—and it is grounded on republican theories which emerged during the Enlightenment and crystallized during the revolution. Of course it’s a process; it didn’t start with the revolution, but the revolution was a starting point. 

And although France is a country of immigrants because of our past—we colonized many other countries and we still haven’t made peace with that—it is a “country of Frenchmen” despite its cultural diversity. It is one of the most multi-ethnic, diverse, multicultural countries in western Europe, yet it is a monocultural society. The notion of assimilation is ideologically fundamental to French republicanism; that coincides with notions of universalism, pluralism, and secularism. I will focus especially on universalism and secularism, which we call laïcité (because laïcité is a form of secularism, and I will explain why). 

Assimilation is the sine qua non condition to citizenship, meaning that immigrants who want to become French should adopt the French culture (even though this notion of culture or even values are nowhere to be defined) and reject others’ values. Republicanism in France is traditionally defined in its universalist nature, meaning that in France, the French identity transcends particularism—any cultural, social, religious belonging—in order to achieve individual autonomy. This is as opposed to multiculturalism, which can be found especially in the Anglo-American world and seeks the official and sometimes even legal recognition of cultural diversity.

Republicanism presupposes that the state is free from any influence from the church and religion—so I will talk about laïcité. Laïcité is a very interesting concept. It finds its roots in the revolution; because of the very chaotic history we have with the Roman Catholic church especially, France is suspicious towards religion in general. France hates religion, really. Between you and I and everyone who is listening, one of France’s dreams is to control religion—let’s be honest about it.

But fast-forward to 1882, the end of the nineteenth century. It was at school that this notion was implemented first, because school is considered in France the place you go to “make the French citizen,” and in order to do that you need to remove the Catholic church’s influence from education. Under Jules Ferry, who was minister of instruction (meaning education), he passed a series of laws on public education. He replaced religious morals (which was at that time being taught to kids) with civic morals. The idea was not to remove religion, because religion is part of society too—but for the French, the only way for you to be able to be a citizen is for you to be free from religion. 

Then, fast-forward to 1905: we adopted the law of separation of church and state, which is the foundation of the management of state and religion in this country. Fun fact: laïcité does not appear in this law at all. It not until the constitution of 1946 that laïcité is mentioned. But in this law, it’s nowhere to be found. 

This law is quite simple, and it’s a law of appeasement. There were two schools that fought each other during the debates that preceded the adoption of the law: those who really wanted to get rid of religion (no religion; the public square has to be neutral) and the vision of laïcité, which won over in the law but which was not anti-religion but rather anti-clerical. So it’s more the power of the church in terms of influence within the political governance structure. 

The idea was simple: to be able to protect freedom of religion, but also freedom of conscience (the right to believe or not believe, to change religion), you need to impose the neutrality of the state. Meaning that the state does not recognize or have a favorite religion, and must remain neutral. So civil servants are neutral; religious neutrality is imposed upon the state, not upon private individuals, who are free to exercise their right to freedom of religion and freedom of conscience. That was the idea. 

The idea was not to prevent the visibility of religion from happening. I’m not saying it was all unicorns and rainbows, because there was anti-religious sentiment, especially against the Catholics—and for those who know France’s history with religion, we have a very dark history. But the idea was to appease everybody, and that’s pretty much it.

The problem we have today is—the law of 1905, in my opinion, is very liberal. If we want to compare it with the United States: in the US, they have a wall of separation between religion and the state (theorized by Roger Williams, the founder of the state of Rhode Island), the idea that nobody interferes with each other. It was made in a way that religion, believers, are protected against potential abuses from the state. In a way, America is a laic country—but their view is you can be as religious or areligious or atheist as you are and you are protected because as an individual you have the right to think what you want. In France it’s the other way around: we want to protect the state from the abuses of religion. 

In France, religious freedom has limits—it’s public order. For the French, it was a liberal law. Now, the problem is: this very liberal vision has been transformed into a tool to target religious minorities, and especially Muslims and Islam. It has been many years, but again we need to take into account our colonial past and the way we treated Muslims in our colonies (I’m especially thinking of Algeria, but not only).

Now, laïcité has been transformed into a monster that has nothing to do with the law of 1905. Now we have a restricted view of laïcité which implies erasing any view of religion, and it goes against the spirit of the law of 1905. It’s dangerous; we went from a liberal interpretation to an illiberal one—but one of the problems of laïcité is that even if its historical definition is agreed upon, there is no legal definition of laïcité. I think this was done on purpose by the lawmakers at the time. When you don’t have a definition, it’s open, and you can have a very liberal definition of laïcité depending on the time, the situation, and the context, or a very restrictive one. That’s the main issue today. 

EA: Especially among the youth, there’s more ease with the notion of multiculturalism, with the notion that you can be more than one thing at a time. This is definitely making a lot of people in power and on the right (but not just on the right, which is part of the problem) fairly uncomfortable.

Can you talk a bit about that phenomenon as well?

RA: Anything that comes from the Anglo-American world is seen as a threat here, which is very sad. It speaks volumes more about the people in power than those who feel comfortable enough in their identity to promote it in a way that is faithful to the French tradition. 

The republican tradition still holds very strong within French society, and social policies in France emphasize the notion of assimilation—to which I would ask: assimilation to what? Most of the time we talk about mainland France. We tend to forget we have overseas territories: Guiana, Guadeloupe, New Caledonia, Mayotte, Réunion, and so on, what is now referred to as French Polynesia. Their cultures are very different from ours, and it’s okay! That’s what makes France so vibrant, dynamic, and awesome.

So assimilating to what exactly? What kind of values are we talking about? We all know the answer: the answer is that those in power want to remain the ones in power, and dominate other groups that are more vulnerable—minorities and people of immigrant backgrounds especially. One of the reasons is, we are a country in denial. We still refuse to see our past, to make peace with our past, to repair our past to move forward to a better future. Colonialism in France—of course, it’s not taboo for historians, activists, researchers; everybody has studied it. But for those in power it’s still a sore topic.

Colonialism is “in the past,” and we still talk about the “positive” effects of colonialism—can you imagine that? What kind of positive? It’s wild. Today there are voices, from people of immigrant backgrounds, who are like, Hello, we need to do something about this. The main issue with the political establishment is that they still do not accept the fact that the second and third generations of these children are French and consider themselves French. For years, and it’s still going on: we still don’t count this population as part of the fabric of this country, even though these people, the immigrants who came to this country after decolonization, built this country. 

It’s racism. Let’s put a word on this phenomenon. But there’s this thing: It’s not racism! We’re not America! We don’t see color! We are a colorblind nation, we are a universalist country! You know what? In theory I would agree. It’s great that we are universal, we don’t see you as a “minority,” we see you as a human being that deserves protection. But come on, in practice? Discrimination is rising. You have a better chance to get a job if you are white and your name is Jean-Claude than if you are Black or of North African background and your name is Mohamed. 

I’m not just saying that; there are reports about it. We have an ombudsman, the “défenseur de droits,” the defender of rights, who constantly writes reports about that. Racial profiling is another topic for another time, but we do have issues with racial profiling, economic disparities, low social mobility. We are using “universalism” as a way to remain blind: We cannot be racist, we do not see color, what are you talking about? We are not America!

We always come back to We are not America—but we are not talking about America here, we are talking about this country. The problem is today that the power structure is being shaken. Because it’s not sustainable. It will fall apart at some point. But it will get worse before it gets better.

EA: “We are not America” makes me giggle sometimes, because in the UK it’s “We are not Europe.” 

I’ll come back to a UK-France comparison, but as it happens, just a few days ago (we are recording this on April 9, 2021) it was announced that L’observatoire de la laïcité, the observatory of laïcité, of secularism, would be shut down. This is a big deal, but it hasn’t gotten the coverage it should be getting outside of France, as far as I know. It goes back to what you were talking about: the importance of different interpretations and how this is threatening people in power.

To that end, can you expain the role of the observatory, and the significance of this move by the minister delegate for citizenship? I would note that Jean-Louis Bianco, the president of the observatory, asked, “Why do they want to break a tool that works?” and then answered, “We bother them because we are independent.”

Would you mind explaining what happened there, who they are, and why it’s important?

RA: To give a bit more precision regarding the timeline: technically the term of the president and the rapporteur of the observatory of laïcité ended on April 2, but the mission of the observatory ends in 2022, next year. It’s a period of transition, basically.

Some quick background: the observatory of laïcité is basically the guardian of laïcité. It’s a consultancy agency; it’s an independent administration, a consultative commission designed to help the government enforce and promote laïcité. Sorry to get into the legal details, but it is attached to the prime minister, however they are very autonomous and independent, (to use the words of Jean-Louis Bianco). They are composed of twenty-three members, including members of parliament from across the political spectrum. That’s what makes it so appealing and so strong: it brings together many views from different political ideologies and ideas, and they also have experts on the topic and highly qualified civil servants who work for them. 

Why was it announced by Marlène Schiappa that the observatory will be dismantled? Because they did their job. They explained the law of laïcité; they did fantastic fieldwork. They advise the government, but they also give training in public schools as well as private organizations to explain the law, without any form of partisanship. That’s the law, that’s the rule, that’s how it works. They refused to fall into the trap of going after Muslims for the sake of going after Muslims. 

They were heavily criticized for not going after Muslim women wearing headscarves; they would explain to you in what cases the headscarf is prohibited and in what cases it’s perfectly fine for them to do that. I’ll give you a prominent example: another issue in France is we have groups of what I call fundamental secularists, from the left—it’s a very loud fringe on the intellectual left who are really anti-religion and very anti-Muslim as well. They have very questionable tactics and go after anyone who defends a liberal vision of laïcité, and unfortunately Jean-Louis Bianco and Nicolas Cadène (the president and rapporteur) were victims of campaigns of harassment and pressure, and these groups managed to influence the state.

That’s what happened here: the government is more into implementing a very restrictive vision of laïcité that literally has nothing to do with 1905. As proof of that, yesterday there was an article in Le Monde, an interview with Jean-Michel Blanquer, the minister of national education, who literally admitted that he succeeded in implementing his restrictive view of laïcité! I have written extensively about it; that’s what I call the weaponization of laïcité. The same way some use religion for their political agenda (and there are a lot of countries doing that), in France we use laïcité to fulfill ours: to make sure that laïcité is not about freedom but is about restriction and targeting certain groups we deem incapable of integrating—the Muslims.

Unfortunately, this comes at a time when we need the observatory more than ever, because they bring sanity to this madness. They are the only ones who actually held the line and explained the law. We don’t have any further details, but apparently they are going to replace it with another institution that might be a sort of administration of laïcité. I hope to be wrong on this one, but what I fear will happen is we will replace the observatory with an institution whose goal will be to be the police of laïcité. It’s really not good news.

EA: I have the same fear. To add to what you were saying about Blanquer, he even said that it’s a “challenge for civilization.” For me, as soon as you use the C-word, civilization, that’s when a lot of the red flags start popping up.

The day after that announcement, on April 6, a rightwing senator said, “We need to refuse prayers in the hallways of universities,” implying Muslim prayers. Putting aside that we’re in the middle of a pandemic and there aren’t that many classes, you and many others have responded saying, I’ve been at the university for years and I’ve never seen that happening. 

From where I’m standing, as an anti-authoritarian, this is something I try to keep track of in different places: usually when such comments become more open and normalized, it becomes a slippery slope, because they shift the center of what is normal to talk about. In this case it’s becoming more rightwing, even with the complicity of many on the left. I have a lot to say on this.

Do you have a reflection on this slippery slope? In legal terms, you may have more insight than I do on where this can lead, in terms of what gets normalized.

RA: When I listened to this MP who wanted to pass an amendment declaring we need to stop prayers—I have been in university for way too long. I thought it was also Le Gorafi. It’s a joke! Come on, I have never seen that in my life. We have ninety-nine problems in the university, but praying in the hallway is not one of them.

The worst problem we have, besides the wi-fi never working, is that research is underfunded, our researchers are all leaving, and there is a rise in student poverty. Many of them, during the pandemic, are mentally struggling. Some try to commit suicide. And the priority of some is to prevent prayers in the hallway? Honestly I’m not even surprised. We have a saying in French: “plus c’est gros, plus ça passe,” meaning roughly, “The bigger the lie, the more likely people will believe it.”

I put Islamo-leftism in the same category. Nobody heard about Islamo-leftism (except those who have been following the debates of course), but as soon as you throw something and start to play with this notion that This is a threat, we need to be careful, we’re going to legislate on it, you’re playing with people’s fears, because people want “security.” So of course people will start believing it.

Is it a slippery slope? It’s more than a slippery slope. It’s authoritarian methods—and I do not use that word lightly. I don’t like to use the A-word just for the sake of it, just like “fascism.” I use that very cautiously. But in terms of strategy—because I will never compare the situation in France to those who actually live and have to go through authoritarian regimes—it is the same method. You target a group of people, whether it’s Muslims or women’s rights activists or LGBTQ+ activists, you count them as a threat, and you are going to make things up to be able to pass legislation to justify more restriction of civil liberties. That’s what is currently going on in France.

There is not a year in this country without us passing a law restricting civil liberties even more—that’s the issue. We use Muslims today, but after Muslims they will go after another group of people. It’s not a new phenomenon; go back to history, that’s how it starts. I don’t want to sound alarmist, and I know that today compared to years ago we now have legal ways to counter that, but still it is dangerous. It is extremely dangerous and worrying, because now we don’t care about the rule of law anymore.

And they will tell you that to your face! The rule of law does not allow us to fight terrorism, so yes, we need to bypass it when we can. We are talking about people who are working for courts saying that! Unfortunately, that’s how the vilification process works. You target someone, you make things up—or if it’s a marginal phenomenon you make it bigger than it is—and instead of opening a debate (and you don’t need a debate on something that’s completely made up), you vilify people. 

So yes, I think we’ve crossed a red line, and unfortunately I think we’ve reached a point of no return here. The problem is: the more it’s normalized, the more it’s mainstreamed, the more some media will actually condone it without giving voice to the people affected by these measures, the more we are at risk to see our democracy and its foundation falling apart. Unfortunately we are in the middle of that process.

EA: There is a direct link between this fear-mongering and the state putting forward bills such as the one “strengthening republican principles” and the one on “global security”—you mention both of those in the piece. Can you talk a bit more on these bills or if there are other bills that I haven’t mentioned? This will help elucidate the problem a bit more.

RA: As you know, France has gone through horrific terrorist attacks. I don’t have words to qualify—they are horrible. The latest was an attack in Nice against a church, and Samuel Paty, a teacher, was slaughtered for doing his job. The problem we have in France is that the response to terrorist attacks is often an emotional response and not a rational one. I personally believe that it’s in a time of crisis like this that we need to protect and reinforce civil liberties even more—and we are doing the opposite.

Every terrorist attack is used as an excuse to pass laws that violate our civil liberties. In the bill “strengthening republican principles,” which is currently being discussed—this is not even a counterterrorism bill. In my opinion, it’s a bill that literally reshapes the relationship between state and religion, to control Islam even more. You might have heard about the amendment prohibiting the wearing of religious signs for people going with kids on school trips. It’s targeting women who wear headscarves who go on school trips to help teachers. Someone explain to me with straight face how that is going to stop terrorism and radicalization!

Also the bill on global security: one of the most controversial amendments is a prohibition on taking pictures of cops during protests. 

And there is a forgotten one that has not really been discussed: the “reform” of universities. One particular amendment, which has since been rewritten, stated that for all lecturers, “academic freedom is exercised having regard to the values of the republic.” It is straight from the authoritarian playbook. Who decides? Who controls? What does that even mean? Knowing that academic freedom is constitutionally protected, this amendment was meant to die immediately, but the damage was done. It’s not the point whether it passed or didn’t pass—it’s here. During the discussion on the bill “strengthening republican values,” many amendments went after universities. 

All these measures are taken to cover our incompetence and failure to actually address terrorism. France has one of the strongest legal imperatives in matters of countering terrorism. After the 2015 terrorist attacks—Charlie Hebdo, Bataclan, and so on—we went through two years of state of emergency. Spoiler alert: it’s now normal. After the end of the state of emergency, we adopted a law on “interior security and the fight against terrorism” in 2017 which essentially made many features of the state of emergency laws—which are extremely restrictive laws in the matter of civil liberties—into permanent law.

And yet: we were not able to prevent terrorist attacks from happening! And what are we doing? We are passing more laws to go after civil liberties on the grounds of fighting terrorism and radicalization. We often use the argument of “terrorism” to propose, adopt, and work on such types of laws, and not only will this response not change a thing, but it will most likely worsen the situation by eroding civil liberties and increasing the stigmatization of Muslims, who keep being perceived as the “usual suspect.”

There are many signs that the political elites, and even some in academia (it’s a fringe, but it’s still strong; in academia there is a structure of power, it’s a microcosm), are ready to abandon the core value of the rule of law. Fundamental rights, human rights, civil liberties—now more than ever—need to be defended, because they are on trial. They are on trial, and it’s in times of crisis that we need to strengthen civil liberties and human rights.

EA: On a more abstract level, I wanted to mention a conversation I had recently with professor David Andress. He fits the profile of the sort of person the people we’re complaining about would hate the most. He’s English, and his specialty is the French revolution; he wrote a book called Cultural Dementia in which he explicitly compares France, the UK, and the US—taboos all around.

One of the things worth pointing out from that conversation is how ironically similar the UK and France are on many things. Of course they have their own specificity, I don’t want to make any blanket statements. But in the UK, we’re seeing stuff like the obsession over the union flag. There’s a good writeup in the Guardian which compares how in the nineties everyone was fine with the Spice Girls wearing the union flag and shoes and socks—it was part of the Brits not taking themselves too seriously—but this has changed. 

There are lots of Tory MPs saying there should be a union jack on every schoolground in the UK (forgetting that on the union jack there is no flag of Wales, so that’s a bit awkward). There is the fact that so many cops were sent to protect the statue of Winston Churchill on Trafalgar Square in London from “woke militants.” There are Tory MPs telling the BBC to remember that the B stands for “British,” implying that the BBC is now somehow not British enough, and so on.

In France, it’s La République, caps lock. In both cases, it’s at once a “strong” thing—in the UK they say “strong and stable,” that was Theresa May’s main thing (which collapsed a few weeks later)—it’s both “strong and stable,” but at the same time it requires constant defending from imagined enemies. This is where the slippery slope starts happening, because the enemies cannot always be imagined; you have to apply that violence on actual bodies. That’s how it’s always worked.

Lots of people will see the irony in these two former empires—one a monarchy, one a republic—having so much in common.

I’ll transition to something that may appear off-topic, but it’s actually relevant. I had an episode with Daniel Randall, a British Jewish leftist activist currently writing a book on the specific phenomenon of leftwing antisemitism in the UK. One thing I’ve come to notice (and this is where my background as a Lebanese Palestinian comes into play) is that issues related to Israel/Palestine in France, as in the UK, are very rarely about Israelis or Palestinians. It’s rather about these two specific countries’ own histories and legacies—in the UK, the Balfour declaration and so on.

This is another consequence of the narcissism of post-imperial countries largely in denial of that imperial past: There’s no point in seeing what’s actually happening there, it’s about our imagined relationship to that land. Brexit is a more obvious example. In my conversation with David Andress I mentioned how there was one Tory MP who said during the Olympics that the “British empire” was winning the gold medal, and she showed a map of the commonwealth—India, Australia, and so on—so it was pretty explicit. 

In France it’s mostly about denying colonialism and its legacies, but it’s also about denying the role of France in the Holocaust. This is something many people don’t understand. When it comes to France, the relationship to the past alternates between occasional recognition (usually surface-level; Macron sort of recognized some horrors while campaigning) and obsessive repetition. The fact that Macron and Chirac (to their credit) even mentioned France’s Nazi past was enough to provoke a huge backlash, from the right (which is expected) but also from the left. 

This is where anti-authoritarian priorities come into play. Chirac recognized that there were crimes; Macron said more specifically that there was “official French culpability” in the Holocaust because of the Vichy regime. But both Mélenchon on the left and Le Pen on the far right agree on the fact that “this was not France” that committed these things, because for them, France equals “The Republic,” and The Republic was in exile in London. With that in mind, what they’re saying is France was not France. 

It’s very easy if you start with that—It wasn’t us. Of course this doesn’t deny the French resistance; on the contrary, they were resisting an internal enemy in addition to an external enemy, the Nazi occupation. But this denies the fact that it was the French police and the French gendarmes that decided to arrest and deport 13,152 Jews in the “rafle Vel’ d’Hiv’,” the Vel’ d’Hiv’ roundup.

The reason I’m bringing it up is there’s increasing talk in some anti-authoritarian circles (it’s not as mainstream as I would hope) that the general hostility towards, or fear of, the past goes beyond Islamophobia, and it takes different manifestations. Islamophobia in both the UK and in France is sort of the first point; it’s what they use to deny the past—in this case it’s about denying the colonial past. So for me, when I hear the “light” Holocaust denial of the variety of Mélenchon and Le Pen, it’s a canary-in-the-coal-mine situation. To paraphrase an activist called Vicky Osterweil, it’s a “dual scapegoat” of the Jew within and the Muslim without.

My question to you is a bit more abstract. In the UK, I would argue that both Islamophobia and antisemitism are common; they take different forms; they don’t affect political culture in the same way in immediate terms. Islamophobia has more political capital, and it’s just easier for various reasons. In France as well, it’s just easier—although, as the Vel’ d’Hiv’ shows, antisemitism can exist above the surface, it’s just not called that.

Do you see links between these two—antisemitism and Islamophobia—in terms of the law and in terms of political rhetoric? We mentioned comparisons to the thirties; this gets thrown around a lot and I don’t want to take it further than we should, but there is a real and objective reason why some of these alarm bells should ring. This question is specifically about the unwillingness in France to confront this past—do you see these parallels with the UK? To me it’s clear as day.

RA: I just hope to do justice to your brilliant comments and observations—I agree with you. A couple of thoughts: first of all, antisemitism is still going very strong in France. It’s horrific, it’s disgusting. It’s concerning to see that so much hatred—across the political spectrum, from the far right to the far left—is still going on against our Jewish communities, who do not feel safe. In France, in 2021.

Even worse, we are using the Jews today as a way to go after Muslims. Jewish communities are being used as pawns—divide-and-conquer is really what it is, which is a very colonial mindset. I’ll give you this example because it comes up often in our current debate: when we talk about the hijab, or anything related to Muslims and flavored with strong anti-Muslim sentiment, to justify the anti-Muslim hatred, some politicians, pundits, and intellectuals would argue: Islam cannot fit in Europe, Islam cannot fit in France, because your values violate “Judeo-Christian” values, don’t fit into “Judeo-Christian cilivization.“

To which I always respond: The ‘Judeo’ part of Judeo-Christian values? Before or after the Holocaust? Before or after the Dreyfus affair? We’re the country of the Dreyfus affair. I cannot stop talking about this; it’s the case of a French soldier who was accused of treason even though he didn’t do it—he was dismissed from the army, all his honors were removed, and it wasn’t untl years after that we discovered the plot. The whole case was fed with antisemitism. You probably know of “J’Accuse!” There were the pro- and the anti-Dreyfusards; France was divided in two. 

And it’s still the case today somehow. Of course it’s not the same situation, but it’s still here. And this is a similarity with Muslims; we still see Jews as Others, as people who are not part of this country. I think it’s horrific, horrible. Conspiracy theories are always based on Judaism and Jews—COVID is a conspiracy from the Jews! Oh my god, stop it. It’s so ridiculous and dangerous. Unfortunately this divide-and-conquer works in some circles. Oh, we’re going to protect the Jews but not the Muslims—even though actually both categories deserve protection. It’s not the mistake of the Jews, it’s really the same elite—it’s white supremacy. 

It’s another form of white supremacy. And to keep going on colonialism and the monarchy versus the republic, I always half-joke: France is a republic that is still governed by the ancien régime. To be honest, we are still governed like under a monarchy—except today it’s not a king, it’s a president. The executive is reinforced, and all the régions and départements are basically fiefs like in the Middle Ages. If you listen to the election comments, it’s like, “the fiefs of XYZ politician…” but dude, it’s a republic! You’re not a lord! And we’re the peasants? When I use that word it’s like the “third estate.” 

To connect everything to colonialism, France is still governed by its colonial mindset. It still hasn’t got rid of it, because that’s how it works. The problem is, the more they are called out on that, they know it’s not sustainable. I will give credit to Chirac and Macron; indeed, with Chirac, for the first time—if you take the war of Algeria (I don’t want to dismiss other countries; Morocco suffered, Tunisia suffered, Mauritania, Senegal, sub-Saharan Africa, don’t get me wrong), the thing with Algeria is that at that time it was not just a protectorate, it was a French département. As in, a French province. So the day of independence, when France “lost” Algeria, is like if the US “lost” Texas or California.

Essentially, Chirac, for the first time, talked about a “war” of Algeria. Until then, we talked about the “events.” It was just a public order disturbance! Fun fact for listeners: state of emergency laws were born under the war of Algeria, the “public order disturbance.” No, it was not a “public order disturbance,” it was people who didn’t have any rights, who were controlled, colonized, who had the worst crimes committed against them, who wanted to be free. They were fighting for their freedoms, because they were not treated as humans, as equal to other French citizens. 

There were “les indigènes,” the indigenous; they didn’t have the same rights, because they were Muslims. Muslims were deemed incapable of integrating. Islam was not a religion that was able to “fit” into that culture. A decree gave rights to the Jews—so you know, divide and conquer—but the Jews were treated less well than the Christians. France did that in a lot of countries. Of course I’m not being nuanced here; there is so much to say, but I won’t get into the details.

Macron, during his presidential campaign, called colonialism what it is: a crime against humanity. Rapes were committed. Murders were committed. The first time we used gas chambers was against Algerian Muslims, by general [Thomas Robert] Bugeaud, in the eighteenth century when the French started to arrive in Algeria to colonize it. We put a bunch of Algerian Muslims, Algerian people, women and men, who were fighting the colonizer, into a cave, and they started a fire to burn them! A gas chamber was used in Algeria at that time, and general Bugeaud has a whole street in Paris named after him. Some consider him a national hero.

I find it problematic, personally, as someone who is of Algerian background—and who is fully French, born and raised here; I don’t have an issue of identity. But it is problematic! How can you celebrate a person who is literally a murderer? So Macron declared that colonization was a crime against humanity, and he received so much hatred from the right, and also from some on the left. No, it was the golden age of France! Les effets positifs de la colonisation—”the positive impacts of colonization?” What in the heck is wrong with you guys? We still believe that colonization was a “mission civilisatrice,” We are going to civilize “the savages!” That was the rhetoric, by the way, at that time. 

Somehow we’re still not over it, even though historians and activists have done incredible work. Unfortunately, Macron also made some controversial comments on colonization; it’s not all perfect. And recently he ordered a report from a famous historian, Benjamin Stora—it was a good thing; I didn’t expect much, but it was one step forward. The report was all about trying to reconnect [France and Algeria], add statues of Algerian heroes—but out of the question to apologize. 

I’m like You know what? I don’t care about statues of Emir Abdelkader if you don’t apologize. For me, not apologizing means two things: that you don’t think what you’ve done was wrong, and second—Algerians know what happened. France needs to apologize for itself, to not repeat the same mistake in the future (not necessarily talking about colonization, but violation of human rights, how we treat minorities, and so on). 

No apology? Then what? Okay, you’re going to add statues, open a museum. I’m not against that, don’t get me wrong. But colonization has been used by both Algeria and France for their own political agendas: in France, to do what we’re talking about, and in Algeria, which is an authoritarian military regime, to control its own population and to justify such an action. And nobody buys it—seriously, especially among the younger generations, nobody buys it.

Everybody wants to move forward. The issue in this country is when you call that out—that’s why post-colonial studies bother; we study things that are very tough but that are necessary. Nobody is asking to organize a coup against the French republic! No, this happened; we need to find a solution to repair what we have done, to make our future better as French citizens. That’s something that the French establishment still refuses to do.

To connect everything with antisemitism, unfortunately it still reminds me of the worst times in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when we considered the Jews incapable of being French citizens because they were Jewish. They were deemed incapable of being part of France, because their culture, their religion was “not compatible” with French values and culture, according to the elites at that time.

My point is: throughout history, those who want to get power and dominate always use a scapegoat to advance their agenda and keep their power, and use good old divide-and-conquer. We need to move beyond that; it is dangerous for democracy, it is dangerous for the rule of law. Where do we stop?

So yes, antisemitism must be fought, definitely, and any form of racism. The thing is, today we still refuse to recognize anti-Muslim hatred for what it is, because it is acceptable to go after a religion or a group of people that we deem “incapable of integrating.” And that’s the same rhetoric we used during colonization. 

EA: The term “Judeo-Christian” is a recent invention, it’s not a historical one—and as you said, it overlooks that the “Judeo” bit has been rejected by the “Christian” bit for ninety percent of Europe’s history. People who are conservative and who are Jewish say they are uncomfortable with the term “Judeo-Christian” due to that history.

But with the whole “Jew within, Muslim without,” I have a previous episode with Aida Hozić from Bosnia, and one thing that’s very obvious about the Muslim Other (and we know what happened at Srebrenica and Sarajevo and Bosnia in general, the story of that genocide)—the comparisons are never good. Comparing is imperfect, but it’s useful inasmuch as it allows us to see some of these parallels.

The whole “this is not as bad as the thirties” was used in America quite a lot, and we saw Trump say he would protect Jews against the Muslims, even as his supporters were chanting stuff like “Jews will not replace us” in Charlottesville, and we know the massacre at the synagogue. Divide-and-conquer is a very old strategy, but it doesn’t get translated very well, even by people who are supposed to be doing it. It’s a very messy business and they’re not as smart as they would like to believe. And that’s not really the point—the point is power, to effect power. 

Some weeks ago I interviewed [Raphaël] Arnault with La Jeune Garde in Lyon, an antifascist collective. For those who don’t know, Lyon was the birthplace of Génération Identitaire; they were banned some weeks ago but are still active in cities like Lyon. There are elections coming up next year, and Le Pen’s driving political energy is nationalism—she herself says it is “nationalism versus globalism.” 

Anyone studying antisemitism knows the connotation of the term “globalism”—it started in far-right literature, it has a very old history. The idea of a “globalist” as attached to a Jewish person, pre-Holocaust and also post-Holocaust, is that the Jewish person cannot be a nationalist—cannot be French, cannot be Polish, and so on. The Dreyfus affair was one of the founding stories of [Theodor] Herzl, and that’s why Zionism came about (at least that’s what he gets into), because for him, Even in the “land of Enlightenment,” they rejected us, therefore we cannot stay here.

This goes back. The notion of a globalist, of someone who does not have “loyalty” to the “homeland,” has deep antisemitic roots and connotations. It doesn’t have to manifest itself against Jewish persons on a daily basis, but that’s the underlying authoritarian logic that gets replicated. Other than being bad in itself, and generating fear among Jewish persons who understand coded language, it also says something about society: We (those in power) are imposing a certain vision on society, and we who have the mechanisms of the state have the means to effect it on these bodies—in this case Muslims especially, but also possibly Jews. If this continues, if Le Pen gets in power, they will not be safe either; unfortunately many are led to believe they would be by scapegoating Muslims, but that’s not how things work. 

So my question to you is maybe more of a personal question. How concerned are you that, regardless of what people who hate it want to believe, the fact a multicultural reality exists means they are going to do—all cards are on the table, depending how much power they get and depending how much that gets normalized by the elections. How worried are you, personally? 

I am of Arab origins; I am not Muslim but most Islamophobes don’t know the difference anyway, so it doesn’t really matter; I live in Geneva which is literally surrounded by France, so I’m seeing it from without but also from within (I have family in Paris and Marseille)—and these are concerns of mine, both personally and generally. If this takes over France it has connotations for the world in the same way of what we saw in the UK and the US. 

How worried are you?

RA: Before answering that, I will add that anti-Muslim bigotry is a business, too. It makes money, quite literally. I would recommend reading a report written by Wajahat Ali, an American author and analyst, called Fear, Inc. He analyzes the phenomenon of Islamophobia, where the money comes from, and the machinery behind it. This report is brilliant, I highly recommend it. And you can see it in France too: anti-Muslim bigotry makes money. Who cares about the truth? Just throw out a horrific thing and it will create an audience, it will get ads.

As for multicultural values (and I will get to feelings after): in the end, vulnerable people and minorities are just asking to be treated as equal to their fellow Frenchmen and -women. They are only asking for laïcité to apply to them, as in: the state doesn’t interfere with religious affairs and vice versa. They just want to be free—it’s not too much to ask. 

I’m not saying everyone’s perfect; Muslim communities here have issues. Every community has issues. But who is essentializing these communities? We keep saying, We don’t see race! and Multiculturalism, boo!, but who is talking about “The Muslims?” “The Arabs?” The immigrants who are “taking our jobs” but at the same time “living on state welfare” (if that’s the case, immigrants have skills)?

EA: There is a thing called “Schrödinger’s immigrant.” Both very lazy and also taking everyone’s jobs—they’re magic, it’s amazing.

RA: Give them all jobs!If you’re lazy but still capable of accomplishing all that, hey, you’re a CEO right now!

But who is essentializing this population? We don’t see race, but “the Muslims.” If something happens, if there is a murder or an attack: This person from Algeria/Morocco/Tunisia—yeah, he’s French, but no, we are going to give the country this sort of profile. In the end, who is using categories when we are supposed to be a universalist country with universal values that don’t see race or ethnicity or religion? Those who feel incredibly insecure are those in power, because they know that the balance is not in their favor. Like I said, they still consider these people incapable of integrating. 

And as a minority, I’m terrified. I’m not an activist—I respect that, they are doing an incredible job; I am the boring one just analyzing policies and trying to explain things. But I know the law. I know what it is capable of. It can do great things, but it can also do the worst. It’s a bit like having some sort of magic powers—you can do extremely good and extremely bad things. And we’ve seen in the past how the law, or even the constitution, can commit the worst. If you look at the Holocaust, the way we treated Jews: it was legal. It was in the law. The Vichy regime was the French state; lawmakers passed laws. So just because it’s legal doesn’t mean it’s morally acceptable. It’s not, of course. 

Unfortunately, those who know how to use these tools—if not controlled, if not called out, if not pressured—will try to find ways to go after you because of who you are and to make you pubic enemy number one just because you have north African background or are a Muslim, and so on.

I also want to be hopeful, because the judiciary is trying to do its job. But when you have lawmakers who pass crazy laws, the judiciary also has to interpret them in a way that is respectful towards the law. Maybe that’s the difference with the thirties or the forties: today we do have mechanisms to protect human rights, whether it’s different courts (even though some are not doing their jobs) or the European Court of Human Rights. We also have international organizations to protect human rights.

But unfortunately it’s all about pressure and diplomacy in other parts of the world where genocides are being committed. Look at what’s happening in China with the Uyghurs, or in Myanmar with the Rohingya: you call it out and nothing happens. That worries me. Just because we are an “advanced democracy” doesn’t mean it can’t happen to us. That’s the problem in this country—and it’s not just France, it’s across democracies in general: we take liberties for granted. We do not understand that it’s an ongoing fight to protect and preserve them. Unfortunately, those who realize that are those who will be affected most if those civil liberties are attacked—namely minorities, whether it’s Muslims or Jews or women or LGBTQ+ people, groups who are vulnerable because of who they are. 

So yes, I am extremely concerned, and what concerns me even more is those who can have a voice and yet remain silent. Those who remain silent are even more guilty if something happens. I know that sounds hard. But if you have the power to do something, at least use it behind the scenes. Try to do something. Some are just silent because Oh, it’s none of my concern, or, I don’t want to get in trouble and have problems. Even in academia, you write about it in your legal journal that nobody will read, but you refuse to—I don’t want to make generalizations; there are extraordinary people here who are taking risks, who are being harassed on social media because they choose to speak out. But those who remain silent? I hope they will be able to look themselves in the mirror if things get worse and out of control.

EA: It’s part of why I’m also worried. You never need a majority to do horrible things. That has almost never happened—you almost never have more than fifty percent of the population. The reason I’m so worried about France, other than the personal link, is that a lot of it is happening below the surface, because the Anglo world is not covering it well enough. 

I try and have a positive note towards the end; one thing I will say (you said it yourself) is that institutions are better than they were back then. I don’t want people to freak out and go on panic mode. But the notion that “it cannot happen here” is a false one. It may not happen in the same way; the “it” may be defined differently—but something can happen here, and that something needs to be opposed. It Can’t Happen Here is a novel by [Upton] Sinclair imagining how a dictator would be in America in the time if Hitler; It Could Happen Here is a podcast by Robert Evans I recommend, in which he went through scenarios of how authoritarianism can come to America, culminating in the way he spoke about the rise of militias and potentially a coup on the capital.

So a lot of people have been seeing the signs for a long time. This benefits the struggle against authoritarianism broadly. It’s not all doom and gloom.

RA: I’ll chime in with a closing note as well. What is currently going on in France—I often say that France can’t keep its dirty laundry at home anymore. For years, it was, France is the Eiffel tower and macarons and croissants because we didn’t have access to the media, and social media were not really a thing even ten or fifteen years ago, not as mainstream as now. And today, I’m not saying it’s easy, but stories are getting out of the borders.

People are calling it out. Ten years ago, you wouldn’t have any coverage of these issues in the Anglo-American press, but today populations learn languages and are capable of sharing their stories and their experience, and France is shamed. And if there’s something that us French are very protective of, it’s our image. We have that thing: “Le rayonnement de la France a l’étranger,” which is very pompous and arrogant—I don’t even know how to translate it; “the shining of France across the world,” how we’re the bastion of human rights, the Enlightenment, and so on—and yet here we are.

Yeah, it’s a beautiful country with a lot of potential, but we are basically ruining it. And France hates that! French authorities hate the fact that those stories are out there, because they do not control the narrative anymore. It is shameful for a country that prides itself as being the “country of human rights.” Again, the very fact that stories are being shared is a huge positive thing. The New York Times translates their articles into French now. It’s on purpose, I think. 

I just wanted to add that where there’s a will there’s a way. I hope that at some point things will get better if we keep fighting for civil liberties. Because it goes beyond Muslims. It’s everybody at some point as humans, as citizens, who are going to be affected if nothing is done about it.

EA: It’s a good way of ending the episode. Do you have three books to recommend?

RA: Yeah, sure. The first book for all of you nerds is a book from Canadian political scientist Nader Hashemi—

EA: I just interviewed him two weeks ago. The episode will be out by the time this one is out.

RA: There you go! The stars align. His book is Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Towards a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies, from Oxford University Press (2009). It is very complex but so accessible as well. It’s really well-written with a lot of different elements. It’s a comparative study as well. He challenges the question, from a comparative perspective and with a lot of historical elements, of tension between Islam and liberal democracies, and challenges the widely-believed stereotypes that argue the so-called incompatibility of religion with liberal democracy.

It’s interesting because he goes through a lot of studies: France, Turkey, Indonesia. It’s really fascinating. He gives you sneak peeks at how he proceeds to brings some fresh ideas and analysis to the issue. It’s from 2009 but it’s still very timely. It’s academic; it’s not a novel—but sometimes nerds are very needed too. I’m among those, so that would be my first recommendation.

My second one is in French, from Nesrine Slaoui, a journalist—called Illégitimes, “illegitimate.” She basically narrates her path and her struggles coming from an immigrant family (she’s French of Moroccan background). Her family is from the working class, and she tries to narrate how she navigates through those origins, this background, and managed to get into Sciences Po, one of the most elitist schools of higher education in the country, and how she became a journalist—and how even after studying journalism at Sciences Po, she’s still struggling with how she’s perceived in the milieu, in her field of work. It’s beautiful.

I don’t want to give away too much, but she published an interview she had with her grandpa, who cannot speak French. It speaks volumes about the current situation in France, about social mobility—how in the end, the elitist schools are still reserved for the elite, and how it is hard for minorities to get into them, and even if they get into them, they will be accused of benefiting from what we call “positive discrimination programs” (hate that term!). In the end, if I cannot access the elite, how do you want the system to change?

At the time when Emmanuel Macron announced he wanted to end the École Nationale d’Administration, the NA, to “tackle those issues”—what good does it do to remove an institution? Then what? These issues have to be tackled at the roots, starting with housing and social issues, racism, discrimination, and the situation in the banlieues, the poorest neighborhoods in the country.

The third one is a beautiful and powerful book by Rachid Zerrouki at Robert Laffont (2020) called Les Incasables. I don’t know how to translate that. It means “those who do not fit.” Rachid tells his journey as a teacher in a public school—he teaches specifically in what we call the Segpa, the “sections of adapted general education and professional training.” Usually these are kids who are in great difficulties, whether it’s health issues or social issues, economic issues; even within their families—sometimes they are in foster families. 

Life has not been kind to them. When I used to go to school, the Segpa were considered the people you should not deal with or be involved with, or be friends with. One of my closest friends was in a Segpa; he’s still a friend of mine. They are marginalized. 

Rachid tells his story as a teacher in such an environment, and all the lessons of life he learned thanks to these kids. He starts with his own origin; he’s French-Moroccan, born in Morocco and lived there until he came to France (I don’t want to give away too much). It’s an homage to public school and public education that is today being insulted, disregarded. We treat public school like it’s worthless. Look how we treat teachers during COVID. It’s horrific.

I hope these two books in French will at some point be translated, because they really are great.

EA: Amazing. Rim-Sarah, thanks a lot for your time.

RA: Thank you so much for having me, I really appreciate it.